COMMENTED BY NAPOLEON BONAPARTE
Introduction
As Second Chancellor of Florence, Machiavelli had a very active political life. It was a time of change, the feudal system was being replaced by capitalist production, sovereignties were absorbed by monarchies, and there was a centralization of power in Europe, except in Italy.
Machiavelli, then, participated in meetings with foreign courts to make political agreements. His life experiences are reported in this book, showing the common man the true intentions of an ambitious ruler.
Niccoló Machiavelli - To the magnificent Lorenzo, son of Piero de' Medici
Princes always receive good gifts, worthy of them; but not having found any possession of mine, except my experiences, which I offer to your Magnificence, reduced into this small volume.
Therefore, I accept this little gift, and in reading this work, my desire is that it may reach that greatness which fortune and your other qualities assure you.
Chapter I - How many kinds of principalities there are and by what means they are acquired
States can be republics or principalities, which were inherited by blood, or were recently acquired. The new ones, such as Milan with Francesco Sforza, or such members joined to a state that it receives by inheritance a prince, such as the kingdom of Naples to the king of Spain. These domains received are subject to a prince or free, and are acquired by foreign or own troops.
Chapter II - Of hereditary principalities
I will not discuss republics, but only principalities, and I will try to show how hereditary principalities can be governed and maintained. States tied to the prince's family have fewer difficulties in governing than new ones because, one only needs to not abandon the procedure of predecessors, if the prince is intelligent he will remain in power.
In Italy, for example, we have the Duke of Ferrara, who resisted the attack of the Venetians in 1484, and Pope Julius in 1510, solely because the dominion of his family was ancient, and it was evident that he became more beloved.
Chapter III - Of mixed principalities
The greatest difficulty lies in new principalities, which can also be a state joined to an hereditary one, which we could call a mixed principality, this is because the people revolt against the new prince who had to offend the new subjects with his troops and through other offenses that a recent conquest causes.
Then all those who were harmed by the occupation of the principalities will be your enemies, and your friends will be those who put you there because they were dissatisfied, and even if you are strengthened, you cannot be violent against them because you need the good graces of the inhabitants. This was the mistake of Louis XII, King of France, when he occupied Milan, whose people, who had opened the gates, turned against him when they realized that they were wrong about the good that prince would bring.
States conquered and added to an Ancient state, being in the same province and of the same language, are easily subjected, especially if they do not have the custom of living free.
For states with different languages but the same customs, the conqueror, to preserve them, must aim for two rules: first, extinguish the language of the former prince; second, do not modify laws and taxes.
In a province with a different language, customs, and legislation, the most effective way to conquer is for the prince to inhabit it, thus he can put an end to disorders as soon as they arise, otherwise, when the news arrives it will be too late to act. Another way is to form colonies in some places of the conquered province.
The Romans organized colonies in the conquered provinces, see in the province of Greece, Rome fostered the Achaeans and Aetolians, subdued the kingdom of Macedon, and expelled Antiochus.
The desire for conquest is a natural and common thing, and men who can satisfy it will always be praised and never criticized. But those who cannot and want to do so anyway are mistaken, and deserve censure.
Chapter IV - Reason why the Kingdom of Darius, occupied by Alexander, did not revolt against his successors
The fact that Alexander the Great conquered Asia in a few years, and then died soon after, and the people did not revolt against his successors is astonishing. Of the principalities we remember, there are two ways of governing: either by princes assisted by ministers, or by a prince and barons.
Such barons have their own dominion and subjects, who recognize them as lords and bear them natural affection.
Now considering the nature of Darius's government, it will be similar to that of the Sultan of Turkey. If it was necessary for Alexander to defeat the enemy in one fell swoop after victory, with Darius dead, the state was secure. And Alexander's successors, had they kept it united, could have enjoyed that kingdom idly; there were no other disturbances than those they themselves caused.
The conquest of a people is not solely the merit of the victor, but of the differences among the subjugated peoples.
Chapter V - On the method of maintaining cities or principalities that, before being occupied, were governed by their own laws
Explanation of how to preserve governments with innate ideologies. No matter how many new ideologies are infiltrated, the old laws of the principality will persist until the new principality transgresses the old rules and declares new ones, as long as it allows '...the memory of lost freedom to rest.'
Chapter VI - Of new principalities acquired by arms and by virtue
Citation of examples of Moses, Theseus, among others, who became princes by their own virtue.
Chapter VII - Of new principalities acquired by arms and by the fortune of others
The author discusses Cesare Borgia, son of Pope Alexander VI, whose conquests were driven by the power of his father's position and, later, by alliances with stronger individuals than himself, such as Ramiro de Lorca.
Chapter VIII - Of those who have obtained a principality by crime
In this chapter, the author deals with the fact of reaching a principality through '...evil or nefarious deeds...'. It is worth highlighting the way Machiavelli proposes for how injuries to the people should be distributed, according to him, '...all at once, so that, lasting a short time, they cause less harm...'. It is also interesting the way benefits to the people should be provided: '...little by little, so they may be better savored...'.
Chapter IX - Of the civil principality
What can be called a civil principality, as it requires not great valor or fortune, but rather cunning. This is achieved through the favor of the great or the people. In cities, these two dispositions are found, where the people do not want to be oppressed by the great, and the great desire to command and oppress the people. These two desires produce the effects: the principality, freedom, or leadership.
The principality is the work of the people or the great, according to the opportunity embraced by one or the other. The great realize that they cannot oppose the people, so they begin to promote the reputation of a member of the people and make him prince. This person, to remain in power, faces difficulties. The people, realizing their inability to oppose the great, grant prestige to someone and make him prince, so that he may defend them with his authority. This person helps the people without difficulty, as he is surrounded by others who seem equal to him.
On the other hand, he who attains the condition of prince thanks to the people finds himself alone, with no one or few around him who are not ready to obey him. He can honestly and without prejudice to others satisfy the great, but he can certainly satisfy the people, for they have a much more honorable desire than the great, who wish to oppress, and the people do not wish to be oppressed.
The worst that the prince can expect from a hostile populace is to be abandoned by them; but hostile nobles must fear not only abandonment but also attack. This prince must always live with the same people, but not always with the same nobles.
For a prince, it is necessary to count on the friendship of the people, otherwise, there will be no solutions in adversity. A wise prince should think of a way by which his citizens, always and in all circumstances, are in need of the State and of him, so that they will always remain loyal to him.
Chapter X - How the forces of all principalities ought to be measured
Those princes who are able to maintain themselves by themselves, who, by abundance of men and money, can form a strong army and face any assailant. These armies must be governed by laws. Thus, this principality will have a fortified city, but one that does not make itself hated.
Human nature obliges man to reciprocate benefits received. It can be concluded that it will not be difficult for a prudent prince to secure himself from his people.
Chapter XI - Of ecclesiastical principalities
For these, all sorts of obstacles appear, because they are obtained by merit or fortune, but they are maintained by the routine of religion. These are so strong that they can keep their princes regardless of how they live. By virtue of this power, these principalities are considered safe and happy.
It is to be expected that some have made the Papacy powerful by arms. The current pontiff, by his goodness and many other virtues, will make it stronger and more venerated.
Chapter XII - Of the kinds of militias and of mercenary soldiers
It is necessary for a prince to have solid foundations; such as good laws and principles. Since good laws do not exist where there are no arms, therefore, the forces by which a prince preserves his state are either his own or mercenary, auxiliary, or mixed. Mercenary and auxiliary forces are useless and dangerous, as they are not truly bound to the prince, they are ambitious, undisciplined, unfaithful, insolent with friends and cowardly as enemies, they do not fear God, nor do they believe in men. Thus, the prince only delays his own ruin.
The prince must make himself captain; the Republic will send one of its citizens for this role, but if he is unsuccessful, he must be replaced immediately. But if he shows his worth, the Republic must secure his powers through laws.
The captains kept themselves and their soldiers away from fear and work, sparing themselves in battles and allowing themselves to be captured without ransom. Everything was permitted to them in their military code, which aimed to avoid work and dangers. In this way, they enslaved and disgraced Italy.
CHAPTER XIII - Of auxiliary, mixed, and native troops
Auxiliary troops are sent by powerful allies to your aid. These can be good and useful, but in case of defeat, you are down, and in case of victory, you will be their prisoner. Mercenary forces, after a victory, need more time to cause harm, as they were organized and are paid by you.
All prudent princes repelled these types of troops, the auxiliary ones, always preferring their own troops to achieve a real victory.
With this observation of different troops, it is concluded that without possessing one's own troops, no prince is guaranteed from setbacks. Own forces are composed of subjects or citizens, or servants; all others are mercenary or auxiliary.
CHAPTER XIV - Of the duties of the prince toward the troops
CHAPTER XV - Of the reasons why men, and above all princes, are praised or blamed
CHAPTER XVI - Of liberality and parsimony
CHAPTER XVII - Of cruelty and clemency—whether it is better to be loved than feared
CHAPTER XVIII - In what manner princes must keep faith
A prince should have no other objective or thought than war, its organization and discipline, for that is the only art that falls to him who commands. It is of such power that it not only maintains those who were born princes but often elevates citizens of private condition to that quality. A prince not versed in military matters, in addition to other misfortunes, as has been said, cannot have the esteem of his soldiers nor trust in them.
A wise prince should consider the histories of other countries and meditate on the actions of illustrious men, study the reasons for their defeats and victories, and never be idle in times of peace; rather, he should intelligently build up a reserve of knowledge that he can draw upon in adversity, to be ready at any time to resist them.
Princes are made notable by the qualities that bring them blame or praise. Anyone will recognize that it would be very praiseworthy for a prince to possess all the qualities considered good; but the condition of man is such that it does not allow for the complete possession of them; it is necessary for the prince to be so prudent that he knows how to avoid the defects that would cause him to lose his government and practice the qualities that would ensure his possession of it.
Liberality shown to spread the fame of being liberal is not a virtue; if it is practiced virtuously and as it should be, it will be ignored and you will not escape the bad reputation of its opposite. Therefore, not being able to use this virtue without prejudice to himself, he should, being prudent, disregard the reputation of being a miser, for in time, he will be able to demonstrate that he is always more liberal, for he will see that the people realize that the prince's parsimony makes his revenue sufficient, allowing him to defend himself from those who wage war against him, and thus he is liberal to all those from whom he takes nothing, which are many, and stingy to those to whom he gives nothing, which are very few. It is more prudent to have the reputation of being miserable, which brings a bad reputation without hatred, than to incur the reputation of being liberal and also of being stingy, which constitutes an odious infamy.
Every prince should wish to be considered merciful and not cruel; nevertheless, he must take care to employ this mercy conveniently. He should not, therefore, mind the reputation of cruelty to keep his subjects united and faithful, because, with minor exceptions, he is more merciful than by excessive clemency he allows disorders to arise, which can result in murders or robberies. For such consequences harm the whole people, and executions harm only one person. It is much safer to be feared than loved when one is obliged to fail in one of the two. Men hesitate less to offend those who make themselves loved than those who make themselves feared. A prince should make himself feared in such a way that, if he is not loved, he at least avoids hatred, for it is easy to be feared and not hated at the same time. Therefore, a wise prince loves men as they wish to be loved, and being feared by them as he wishes, he should rely on what is his and not on what belongs to others. In short, he should avoid being hated.
There are two ways of fighting: one by laws, the other by force. The first is natural to man, the second to animals. It is necessary for a prince, however, to know how to use both the animal and the man conveniently, and one without the other is the origin of instability. A prudent prince cannot, nor should he, keep his word when it is detrimental to him and when the reasons that determined it cease to exist. A prince cannot follow all those things considered good, often being forced to act against charity, faith, humanity, and religion. In the actions of men, especially of princes, only the good or bad outcome matters. Let him therefore strive to win and preserve the state, for the means he employs will always be judged honorable and praised, because the common people are led by appearances and by the consequences of accomplished facts, and the world is made up of the common people, and there will be no place for the minority if the majority does not find a place to stand.
Chapter XIX - How princes should avoid contempt and hatred
The prince should seek to avoid things that make him hated or despised, and whenever he acts thus, he will fulfill his duty and find no danger in other defects. What makes him most hated is being rapacious and usurping the property and women of his subjects. Being considered fickle, frivolous, effeminate, cowardly, and irresolute makes him despised. Such things should be avoided just as a navigator avoids a rock. He should ensure that his actions demonstrate greatness, courage, seriousness, and fortitude, and as for the particular actions of his subjects, he should ensure that his presence is unshakeable, behaving in such a way that no one thinks of deceiving him or changing his mind.
He should defend himself from these with good arms and good allies, and if he always has arms, he will always have good friends. Internal affairs, in turn, will be stabilized if external affairs are stabilized, unless they are already disturbed by a conspiracy. Regarding subjects, one should fear that they always conspire in secret, and if he has managed to satisfy the people with himself. A Prince should care little about conspiracies if he is loved by the people, for if the people are his enemy and hate him, he should fear everything and everyone. He should esteem the powerful, but not be hated by the people.
And it must be noted that hatred is acquired either by good or bad actions. Therefore, a Prince wishing to preserve the state is often obliged not to be good, because when the majority, be it the people, the senate, or the nobles, on whom he believes he needs to rely to remain in power, is corrupt, it is convenient for him to follow their thinking to satisfy them, and thus, good actions are harmed.
It should be noted at this point that deliberate murders by obstinate men are impossible for Princes to avoid because anyone who does not fear death can carry them out; however, the Prince should not be afraid, as they are very rare. He should only avoid gravely offending any of the people he uses and has by his side in the service of his government, as Antoninus did. He had disgracefully murdered the brother of that centurion, and still threatened him daily, but nevertheless, he kept him in his guard, which was a reckless thing and capable of ruining him, as it happened.
However, whoever observes what has been narrated will understand that hatred and contempt were the reasons for the ruin of many emperors and will also know the reasons why some of them, acting in one way and others in another, some ended well and others had a sad end.
Chapter XX - Whether fortresses and other things of the kind that princes commonly have made are useful or not
Some Princes, to keep their states secure, have disarmed their subjects, others have divided conquered cities, keeping factions to fight each other, others have fostered enmities against themselves, others have sought the support of those who were suspicious of them at the beginning of their reign, and still others have built fortresses.
Taking away their arms, primarily to offend them, implies mistrust or cowardice. Any of these opinions will engender hatred against you. No prince in a new principality has always organized an armed force, but a prince who conquers a new state, which is annexed to his dominion, then it is necessary to disarm that state, except for those who helped to conquer it, and even these, with time, must be made apathetic and soft, so that all the arms of that state are with your soldiers, who lived with you in the old state.
Often, the services of former adversaries serve the prince better than those of men who, out of excessive security, neglect the prince's interests.
Considering all these things, we will praise those who build fortresses and also those who do not, and we will lament those who, trusting in such means of defense, do not care that the people hate them.
Chapter XXI - What a prince must do to be esteemed
Nothing makes a prince so esteemed as great enterprises and giving rare examples of himself. A prince should be careful not to ally himself with a more powerful one, unless necessity compels him, because, if he wins, he will become beholden to the ally; and princes should avoid at all costs being at the mercy of another.
A prince must show himself to be a lover of virtue and honor those who excel in any art.
Chapter XXII - Of the secretaries of princes
The choice of his ministers is not a matter of least importance. For a prince to know his minister well, there is this unfailing method: when you notice that the minister thinks more of himself than of you, and that in all his actions he seeks personal gain, you can be sure that he is not good, and you can never trust him; he who manages the affairs of the state should never think of himself, but always of the prince, and never remind him of things outside the sphere of the state.
The prince, to secure himself from his minister, should think of him, honoring him, making him rich, making him incur obligations to you, making him participate in honors and positions, so that the many honors do not bring him the desire for others.
Chapter XXIII - How flatterers should be avoided
There is no other way to protect oneself from flattery than to make men understand that they do not offend you by telling the truth; but when everyone can tell you the truth, they will lack respect for you. A prudent prince should, therefore, behave in a third way, choosing wise men in his state and granting them alone the right to tell him the truth about matters, but only about those things that he asks them.
A prince should always seek advice, but when he judges it fitting, and not when others desire it. Even if he judges that someone, out of fear, does not tell him the truth, the prince should not fail to show his displeasure. It follows from this that good advice, wherever it comes from, is born of the prince's prudence and not the prince's prudence from good advice.
Chapter XXIV - Why the princes of Italy have lost their states
A new prince is much more watched in his actions than a hereditary one, and when these actions show virtue, they attract men much more and bind them much more than the antiquity of blood. This is because men are much more attached to things of the present than to those of the past, and when they find good in the former, they are content and seek nothing more; indeed, they will take the prince's defense if he does not fail in other things to keep his promises.
Thus, these princes of ours who, for many years, possessed their principalities, and then lost them, should not blame fortune, but rather their own indolence; because never in good times did they think that times could change (and it is common for men not to worry, in times of calm, about storms), when adverse times arrived, they thought of fleeing and not defending themselves, and waited for the populations, tired of the insolence of the victors, to call them back.
You do not want to fall just because you believe you will find someone to lift you up. This either does not happen, or when it does, it will not bring you security, because the defense that does not depend on you is weak. And the defenses that depend on yourself and your valor are always good, certain, and lasting.
Chapter XXV - How much fortune can do in human affairs and by what means to resist it
I do not deny that many have had and have the opinion that the affairs of the world are directed by fortune and by God, so that human prudence cannot correct them, nor does it bring any remedy. This happens with impetuous rivers that, when they become enraged, flood the plains, destroy trees, buildings, everything yields to their impetus, without being able to oppose them; but it is no less true that men can, when the river calms down, provide dikes so that from the next rage of the river, it will flow through channels that will certainly contain part of the damage. The same happens with fortune, its power manifests itself where there is no organized resistance.
Regarding the paths that lead men to the goals they seek, they can be diverse. It is observed that two individuals, to reach the same objective, can act in entirely different ways; conversely, two men acting in the same way may not achieve the same results. But certainly, in whatever way a man behaves, he must modify his behavior according to the times and things.
I conclude, therefore, by saying that, as fortune changes, and men stubbornly maintain their way of proceeding, they are happy as long as their way of acting and the circumstances of the time align. When they do not align, they will be unhappy.
Chapter XXVI - Exhortation to the prince to rid Italy of the barbarians
Thus, having been left as if lifeless, Italy awaits one who can heal her wounds and put an end to the plundering of Lombardy, the tribute of the Kingdom of Naples and Tuscany, and who can cure her long-festering sores. It is perceived that she begs God to send her someone who will redeem her from such cruelties and insolence of foreigners. It is even seen that she is ready and willing to follow a banner, provided there is someone to raise it. There is much valor in the people here, although leaders are lacking. Observe, in duels and tournaments, how much Italians are superior in strength, skill, and intelligence. However, when it comes to armies, such qualities do not manifest themselves. And all this derives from the weakness of the leaders, for those who know are not obeyed, and everyone believes they know a lot, and no one has yet emerged whose valor or fortune is so outstanding that it forces others to make way for him. For this reason, in so much time, in so many wars that have occurred in the last twenty years, every entirely Italian army has performed poorly.
Therefore, it is necessary to prepare arms, to be able to defend oneself from foreigners with Italian valor itself. And although the Swiss and Spanish infantry are considered formidable, both have defects, so that a third power, if created, could not only oppose them but also be confident of victory. It is therefore possible, by knowing the defects of these two infantries, to organize a third that resists cavalry and does not fear its rival. And from this will come the formation of a generation of warriors and the alteration of methods. And these are the things that, reorganized, give reputation and greatness to a new prince.
Therefore, this opportunity must not be missed, so that Italy, after so long, may find a redeemer. This dominion of barbarians already reeks to all. Take, therefore, your illustrious house this task with that spirit and that faith with which good causes are espoused, so that, under your coat of arms, this homeland may be ennobled, and under your auspices may be fulfilled that expression of Petrarch.
APPENDIX - Letter from Machiavelli to Francesco Vettori
Magnificent Ambassador. The graces of God are never late. I say this because I thought I had lost, but weakened, your grace, having you remained so long without writing to me, and I was in doubt as to where the reason might come from. And to all those that occurred to me, I paid little attention, except to that one by which I doubted you had stopped writing to me because you had been told that I was not a good keeper of your letters; and I knew that, with the exception of Felippo and Pagolo, no others had seen them from me. I cannot, therefore, wishing to return equal favors, tell you in this missive anything other than my life, and if you judge that I should exchange it for yours, I would be satisfied to change it. And as Dante said, the science of one who has not guarded what he heard cannot be sustained - I note what I have gathered from his conversation and composed a pamphlet DE PRINCIPATIBUS, where I delve as deeply as I can into the considerations of this subject, discussing what a principality is, of how many kinds there are, how they are acquired, how they can be maintained, why they are lost; and if any fantasy of mine has ever pleased you, this one should not displease you. And of my faith, there should be no doubt, for I have always observed faith, and I am not now about to break it; and he who has been faithful and good for forty-three years, which are mine, should not be able to change his nature; and my poverty is testimony to my faith and goodness. I therefore wish you to write to me again what you think on this subject, and I commend myself to you.
Excerpts from Machiavelli's Discourses on Livy
[Commented by Napoleon Bonaparte]
I - It is difficult for a people accustomed to living under the rule of a prince, having fallen, by some eventuality, under a republican government, to remain in it.
II - A corrupted people in a republican state is maintained with great difficulty.
III - When a monarchical state has begun well, a weak prince can maintain himself in it, but there is no kingdom that can sustain itself when that prince's successor is as weak as he himself.
Princes are weak when they are not always ready to wage war.
IV - The prince who enters a state new to him must renew it entirely.
Whoever becomes prince of a state or province, particularly when he is weakly established in them. It is necessary to establish new governments with new names in cities, a new authority, and new men, as David did when he became king: he must build new cities, destroy old ones, move inhabitants from one place to another, that is, leave nothing unchanged in that province.
He who wishes to reign over a new province, neglecting this wise alternative of living as a private citizen, must do this evil if he wishes to maintain himself.
V - The mob is daring, but in essence it is weak.
I am certain, therefore, that the good or bad disposition of a people should be taken into little account if you are in a position to contain it and to provide for not being offended by any individual, whether well or ill-disposed.
The bad dispositions arising from these causes are formidable and require greater remedies to depress and contain them, whereas this is easier in other bad dispositions, provided that the people do not have chiefs to whom they can resort.
For this reason, a rebellious mob that wishes to avoid such dangers should choose a chief, think about its defense, as the mass of Rome did. When the plebeians do not take such care, what Tito Livio said always happens to them, that is, all together they are audacious, and then each one becomes cowardly and weak when he begins to think about the danger that threatens him.
I do not believe it can be said that among those who were born of humble condition and rose to wield a scepter, there was at least one who did so by force and weakness.
What princes need to do for their elevation is also necessary in new republics, until they become powerful and only need force to sustain themselves.
VI - Whoever rises from a low condition to the highest elevation achieves much more by fraud than by force.
VII - The prince who, through his deference to the governed, believes he can temper their audacity, generally deceives himself.
It has frequently been observed that this word is not only useless but harmful, especially when you exercise it with insolent men who, out of envy or other motives, hate you.
A prince, therefore, should never allow himself to be lowered from his position nor abandon anything, unless he cannot or believes he cannot retain what obliges him to cede. It is almost always the case, when the matter has reached a point where it cannot be ceded willingly, that it is better to let it be taken by force rather than to let it be stolen by means of it. When you cede out of fear, it is to avoid war, and frequently, you cannot cede it willingly; it is better to let it be taken by force rather than to let it be stolen by means of it. When you cede out of fear, it is to avoid war, and frequently, you do not avoid it. He to whom, out of visible cowardice, you have granted what he wanted, will not stop at that.
VIII - How dangerous it is for a prince, as well as for a republic, not to punish insults committed against a nation or an individual.
One can perceive how much indignation caused by the impunity of the guilty must occasion evil, if one considers what happened to the Romans for not punishing the perfidy of their three ambassadors with respect to the Gauls, for whom they had been sent to Clusium.
The Gauls, learning that those who deserved only punishment were honored, looked upon this conduct as an offense and ignominy to themselves and, indignant and angry, threw themselves upon Rome and took it, with the exception of the Capitol.
This misfortune did not happen to the Romans solely because they had failed in justice, but because their ambassadors, who should have been punished for having acted criminally against the law of nations, were showered with honors for this infamy. Let princes take care, therefore, for if they are gravely offended by someone, individual or state, and receive no satisfaction for it, they will exact revenge in a manner that is disastrous for the state.
The prince should never underestimate any of his subjects who believes that, by adding his own injury to one that one of them may have done him, whether private or courtier, he can take revenge on the prince, even if it attracts misfortune upon himself.
IX - Fortune blinds the spirit of men when she does not want them to oppose her designs.
If one considers the course of human affairs, one will recognize that accidents frequently occur against which the heavens did not wish men to be able to preserve themselves.
Nothing is truer than this conclusion: men whose lives have been formed by great adversities or by perennial prosperity do not deserve censure or praise.
When fortune desires great things to be done, she works competently by choosing a man of great genius to recognize the opportunities she will present him with and of values extensive enough to take advantage of them.
It is true that men can aid fortune; they can direct, not cut, the thread of her operations. Nevertheless, they should never be discouraged, because not knowing the end to which she leads and walking through controversial and unknown paths, they should always hope and, consequently, sustain themselves with hope, without any critical or uncomfortable circumstance in which they find themselves.
X - A government should avoid entrusting positions or administrations of some importance to those whom it has offended.
This truth is so evident that it is enough to present here the example that Roman history offers us.
When we see that resentment exerts such an influence on a Roman citizen, in times when Rome was not corrupted, we must foresee how much it can do in a citizen of a state where corruption has been introduced and where souls are devoid of all ancient Roman magnanimity.
XI - Why the French were and still are looked upon, at the beginning of combat, as more than men and less than women when it drags on.
To demonstrate my opinion, I must observe that there are certain types of armies: the first is one in which order is combined with fury, and in which fury and valor stem from the prevailing order; such was the effect that the Romans observed in their armies.
Another type of army is one in which there is no natural fury nor western order; such are the Italian armies of our time, which are for this reason absolutely useless.
XII - Of the genius of the French
French geniuses recognize the benefits and harms of the moment so quickly that they retain little memory of past goods and evils and are little concerned with future good or evil.
XIII - Painting of things in France
The French are, by nature, more fiery than daring or skillful, and when someone resists their fury in the first onslaught, they become humble and lose so much valor that they become as cowardly as women.
They do not tolerate narrowness and lack of comfort, and time softens them so much in campaign that, if it is possible to make them wait, they disband and then it is easy to defeat them... Therefore, whoever wishes to triumph over them should contain them in their first assault, entertain them to gain time, and he will defeat them. For this reason, Caesar said that the French - Gauls - were, initially, more than men and in the end, less than women.
XIV - Details of Castruccio Castracani, lord of Lucca
In a terrible battle that Castruccio Castracani was fighting against the Florentines, seeing that it had lasted long enough for them to be as tired as his own troops, he ordered a thousand infantrymen to advance through his ranks and ordered those at the front to open up and make a turning movement, some to the right and others to the left, as if withdrawing.
Castruccio used to say that men should experience everything and be surprised by nothing; that God loves valiant men, considering that we should punish the weak through them.
He ordered the execution of a citizen of Lucca who had contributed to his rise, and when it was thrown in his face that he had killed a friend, he replied that they were mistaken, as he had ordered the death of only a new enemy.
Bibliography
MACHIAVELLI, Niccolò. The Prince; commented by Napoleon Bonaparte; translation by Torrieri
Guimarães. São Paulo: Hemus-Livraria Editora Ltda., 1977
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