Aviation enthusiasts have been asking me if I have forgotten about [[Air France 447]]. The answer is, 'no'. What happens is that since September 2011, when the [[BEA]] announced the creation of a Working Group called Human Factors, whose goal is to understand which actions were decisive for the tragic outcome, it seems that once again, the blame will be placed on the pilots and co-pilots. (I use the expression 'placed' on purpose, and I explain myself below)
The mere organization of the group, with this name, is in itself an affirmation that the BEA points to 'human errors' as determining factors for the accident.
silviolobo does not agree with this.
It is a fact that the accident happened very quickly; there are 4 minutes that mark the beginning of the crisis to the moment of impact with the sea. In the first of the four minutes, we have the signal CTL RUD TRV LIM FAULT, very different from what some speculative sources like Wikipedia and sensationalist newspapers show; this does not mean the rudder broke, but that the automatic function that limits rudder movement failed.
What is the consequence of the failure in the mechanism that limits rudder movement?
We friends of good Simulators and Flight know that there are limits to the operation of a commercial aircraft. Very different from what cinema portrays, it is not possible to perform very abrupt maneuvers with an aircraft of this size at extreme speeds (such as cruising speed).
At high speed, movements of the rudder, flaps, reversers, or any component of the plane that causes resistance must be done with as much care as possible. An abrupt movement can cause high stress and the 'breaking' of the aircraft (crash plane).
A good explanation taken from Super Interessante Magazine: "If the pilot performs certain maneuvers, it generates very strong gravitational forces - and the fuselage breaks. This is what happened in 2001 with an American Airlines Airbus A300 that took off from New York. The pilot hit turbulence, got scared, and tried to stabilize the aircraft with normal but abrupt movements. The tail of the plane broke off and the A300 crashed, killing 260 people. It may seem like an extreme case, but the resistance of planes to G-force is a central concern of the aeronautical industry. Modern jets have systems that warn when they are flying at an angle, speed, or trajectory that could jeopardize the integrity of the fuselage. And Boeing delayed the launch of its new plane, the 787, to change its design (simulations indicated that, during flight, the wings could suffer G-forces that were too high)" link.
But would it really be the pilot's fault?
I did some research at CBC (Companhia Brasileira de Cartuchos) with the goal of knowing the velocity of a revolver.
A .38 SPL CHOG projectile, the famous 'thirty-eight', 'Traditional for police use', reaches a speed of 229 m/s (824.4 km/h).
The BEA started the "Human Factors" project, which consists of a working group whose creation was announced at the time of the publication of the third interim report on the investigation into the Rio-Paris flight accident on June 1, 2009.
The goal of this working group was to analyze all aspects related to the flight:
- Crew actions and reactions during the last three phases of the flight described in the third interim report, in particular regarding the stall warning;
- Cockpit ergonomics;
- Human-machine interfaces.
This working group is composed of seven experts:
- Three BEA investigators specialized in human factors;
- A psychiatrist specialized in risk analysis;
- A human factors aviation consultant;
- An A330-rated pilot;
- An A330 test pilot.
The BEA may call upon other experts over time and will consult Airbus and Air France when necessary.
The group began its work and promised to finish by the end of December 2011. Its understanding would take into account contributions from both "operations" and "aircraft systems".
All work performed will be included in the Final Report, which will establish the causes of the accident, with publication scheduled for the first half of 2012.
