The in dubio pro societate principle is a legal maxim applied predominantly in Criminal Procedure Law, guiding that in situations of evidentiary uncertainty during the admissibility phase of an accusation, the collective interest in criminal prosecution should prevail over the doubt favorable to the defendant. Its primary purpose is to ensure that issues of merit, especially in intentional crimes against life, are submitted to the constitutionally established natural judge.
Concept and Foundation
The in dubio pro societate maxim does not hold the nature of a codified rule, but rather that of a hermeneutic principle of jurisprudential application, notably in the Jury Tribunal rite. Classical doctrine and the consolidated jurisprudence of Superior Courts attribute to the institute a function of procedural filter, operating in the pronouncement phase (Art. 413 of the Code of Criminal Procedure), a moment in which the magistrate does not issue a conviction judgment, but one of admissibility of the accusation.
The legal nature of the institute is linked to the guarantee of the sovereignty of verdicts (Art. 5, XXXVIII, "c", of the Federal Constitution). It is argued that, in case of doubt regarding authorship or material evidence of the crime, the competence for the exhaustive judgment lies with the Council of Sentences, preventing the singular judge from usurping the constitutional competence of the popular tribunal through premature non-pronouncement.
Historical Origin and Evolution
Historically, the principle emerged as a counterpoint to in dubio pro reo, the latter structured under the mantle of the presumption of innocence. While in dubio pro reo is a judgment rule applicable to the final sentence, in dubio pro societate was consolidated as a rule of procedural routing. In comparative law, Anglo-Saxon doctrine and the continental European tradition diverge regarding its application; in Brazil, the jurisprudential construction was shaped by the need to avoid impunity in crimes of high social harm.
Legal Provision and Framework
Although there is no literal mention of the term in the Code of Criminal Procedure, the procedural foundation lies in Article 413 of the CPP, which establishes: "The judge, with grounds, shall pronounce the accused if convinced of the materiality of the fact and the existence of sufficient evidence of authorship or participation." The extensive interpretation of the term "sufficient evidence" is the normative support that allows for the application of the principle, where the remaining doubt does not lead to summary acquittal or non-pronouncement, but to referral to the plenary.
Practical Application and Jurisprudential Understanding
The Supreme Federal Court (STF) and the Superior Court of Justice (STJ) maintain a majority understanding that, in the pronouncement phase, the maxim in question prevails. The STJ, in repeated rulings (AgRg in AREsp 1,845,321/PE, for example), reaffirms that minimal doubt must be resolved by the Jury Tribunal.
However, there is a recent academic and jurisprudential movement that questions the constitutionality of this maxim against the principle of the presumption of innocence (Art. 5, LVII, CF/88). Guaranteeist currents, led by jurists such as Aury Lopes Jr., maintain that in dubio pro societate is incompatible with the modern accusatory system, arguing that doubt, at any procedural stage, should militate in favor of the accused, under penalty of violating due process of law.
Doctrinal Conflicts and Contemporary Relevance
The current debate revolves around the tension between the "sovereignty of verdicts" and the "presumption of innocence." Contemporary criticism points out that in dubio pro societate can function as a safe conduct for complaints lacking minimal evidentiary support. Its contemporary relevance lies in the need for a balance: the application of the principle should not be an absolute dogma that exempts the Public Prosecutor's Office from the burden of proof, but rather a tool of deference to the natural judge (Jury) when there are contradictory elements that only the jury has the competence to evaluate.
Legal and Jurisprudential References
- 1988 Federal Constitution: Art. 5, clauses XXXVIII (Sovereignty of Verdicts) and LVII (Presumption of Innocence).
- Code of Criminal Procedure: Art. 413 (Pronouncement) and Art. 414 (Non-pronouncement).
- Superior Court of Justice: AgRg in AREsp 2,054,892/MG, Rel. Min. Jesuíno Rissato, Sixth Panel, judged in 2023.
- Supreme Federal Court: General Repercussion in Theme 1087 (Discussion on the limits of the sovereignty of verdicts and the control of evidence in the jury tribunal).
- Doctrine: LOPES JR., Aury. Criminal Procedure Law. 20th ed. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2023.
