COMMENTED BY NAPOLEON BONAPARTE
Introduction
As Second Chancellor of Florence, Machiavelli had a very active political life. It was a time of change, the feudal system was being replaced by capitalist production, sovereignties were being absorbed by monarchies, and there was a centralization of power in Europe, except in Italy.
Machiavelli, then, participated in meetings with foreign courts to make political agreements. The experience of his life is recounted in this book, showing the common man the true intentions of an ambitious ruler.
Niccoló Machiavelli - To the Magnificent Lorenzo, son of Piero de' Medici
Princes always receive good gifts, worthy of them, but I have found nothing among my possessions but the experiences I have gained throughout my life, which I now send to Your Magnificence, reduced to a small volume.
Therefore, I have accepted this small gift, and in reading this work, my wish is that it may lead you to that greatness which fortune and other qualities assure you.
Chapter I - Concerning the different kinds of principalities and the ways in which they are acquired
States are either republics or principalities, which were either inherited by blood or recently acquired. The new ones, such as Milan with Francesco Sforza, or such members joined to a state that receives a prince by inheritance, like the kingdom of Naples to the king of Spain. These received dominions are subject to a prince or free, and are acquired by foreign or one's own troops.
Chapter II - Concerning hereditary principalities
I shall not speak of republics, but only of principalities, and I shall endeavor to show how hereditary principalities can be governed and maintained. States linked to their prince's family have fewer difficulties in governing than new ones, as one need only not depart from the practice of his ancestors, and if the prince is intelligent, he will remain in power.
In Italy, for example, we have the Duke of Ferrara, who resisted the attack of the Venetians in 1484 and the Pope Julius in 1510, merely because his family's dominion was ancient, and it was evident that he would become more beloved.
Chapter III - Concerning mixed principalities
The greatest difficulty lies in new principalities, which can also be a state joined to a hereditary one, which we might call a mixed principality. This is because the people revolt against the new prince who had to offend the new subjects with his troops and through other offenses that a recent conquest provokes.
Then all those who were harmed by the occupation of the principalities will be your enemies, and those who put you there will be your friends because they were dissatisfied, and even if you are strengthened, you cannot be violent against them because you need the goodwill of the inhabitants. This was the error of Louis XII, King of France, when he occupied Milan; the same people who opened the gates turned against him when they realized they were mistaken about the good that prince would bring.
States conquered and added to an ancient state, being in the same province and of the same language, are easily subjected, especially if they do not have the custom of living free.
For states with different languages but the same customs, the conqueror, to preserve them, must have two rules in mind: first, to extinguish the language of the former prince; second, not to modify laws and taxes.
Now, in a province with a different language, customs, and legislation, the most effective way to conquer it is for the prince to go and live there; this way he can put an end to disorders as soon as they arise; otherwise, by the time the news arrives, it will be too late to act. Another way is to form colonies in some places in the conquered province.
The Romans organized colonies in the conquered provinces; look in the province of Greece, Rome fostered the Achaeans and Aetolians, subdued the kingdom of Macedon, and expelled Antiochus.
The desire for conquest is a natural and common thing, and men who can satisfy it will always be praised and never blamed. But if they cannot and want to do so anyway, then they are mistaken and deserve censure.
Chapter IV - Why the Kingdom of Darius, conquered by Alexander, did not revolt against his successors
The fact that Alexander the Great conquered Asia in a few years and then died soon after, and the people did not revolt against his successors, is astonishing. Of the principalities we recall, there are two ways of governing: either by princes assisted by ministers, or by a prince and barons.
Such barons have their own dominion and subjects, who recognize them as lords and dedicate natural affection to them.
Now, considering the nature of Darius's government, it is similar to that of the Sultan of Turkey. If it was necessary for Alexander to defeat the enemy in block after victory, once Darius was dead, the state was secure. And Alexander's successors, had they remained united, could have enjoyed that kingdom at leisure; there were no other disturbances than those they themselves caused.
The conquest of a people is not solely the merit of the conqueror, but of the differences among the subjugated peoples.
Chapter V - On the method of holding cities or principalities that, before being occupied, were governed by their own laws
Explanation of how to preserve governments with innate ideologies. No matter how much new ideologies are infiltrated, the old laws of the principality will endure until the new principality transgresses the old rules and declares new rules, provided that '...the memory of lost freedom is allowed to rest.'
Chapter VI - Concerning new principalities acquired by arms and by virtue The author cites examples of Moses, Theseus, among others, who became princes through their own virtue.
Chapter VII - Concerning new principalities acquired by the arms and fortunes of others The author discusses Cesare Borgia, son of Pope Alexander VI, whose conquests were driven by the power of his father's position and, later, by alliances with stronger individuals than himself, such as Remirro de Orco.
Chapter VIII - Concerning those who have attained a principality by crime
In this chapter, the author deals with the fact of attaining a principality through '...wicked or nefarious deeds...' It is worth noting the way Machiavelli proposes that injuries to the people should be administered, according to him, '...all at once, so that, lasting a short time, they wound less...' It is also interesting the way benefits to the people should be dispensed: '...little by little, so that they may be better savored...'
Chapter IX - Concerning the civil principality
What can be called a civil principality, since it does not require great valor or fortune, but rather astuteness. This is achieved by the favor of the great or the people. In cities, these two dispositions are found: the people do not want to be oppressed by the great, and the great desire to command and oppress the people. These two appetites produce effects: the principality, liberty, or leadership.
The principality is the work of the people or the great, according to the opportunity seized by one or the other. The great realize they cannot oppose the people, so they begin to promote the reputation of a member of the people and make him prince. This prince has difficulties in maintaining himself in power. The people, realizing their inability to oppose the great, grant prestige to someone and make him prince, so that he may defend them with his authority. This prince helps the people without difficulty, as he is surrounded by others who seem equal to him.
On the other hand, he who attains the condition of prince thanks to the people finds himself alone, with no one or few around him who are not ready to obey him. He can honestly and without prejudice to others satisfy the great, but certainly he can satisfy the people, for they have a much more honorable desire than the great, who wish to oppress and the people do not want to be oppressed.
The worst that a prince can expect from a hostile people is to be abandoned by them; but hostile great men must not only fear being abandoned but also being attacked. This prince must always live with the same people, but not always with the same great men.
For a prince, it is necessary to count on the friendship of the people; otherwise, there will be no solutions in adversity. A wise prince must think of a way by which his citizens, always and in all circumstances, will be in need of the state and of him, so that they will always be loyal to him.
Chapter X - How the forces of all principalities ought to be measured
Princes who are capable of maintaining themselves alone, who can, by abundance of men and money, form a strong army and face any assailant. These armies must be governed by laws. In this way, this principality will have a fortified city, but one that does not make itself hated.
Human nature obliges man to acknowledge benefits received. It can be concluded that it will not be difficult for a prudent prince to secure himself from his people.
Chapter XI - Ecclesiastical principalities
These face all sorts of obstacles, because they are obtained by merit or fortune, but are maintained by the routine of religion. These are so strong that they manage to keep their princes no matter how they live. By this power, such principalities are considered secure and happy.
It is to be expected that some have made the Papacy powerful by arms. The current Pontiff, by his goodness and many other virtues, will make it stronger and more revered.
Chapter XII - Of the kinds of militias and of mercenary soldiers
It is necessary for a prince to have solid foundations; such as good laws and principles. As good laws do not exist where there are no arms, therefore, the forces by which a prince preserves his state are either his own, mercenary, auxiliary, or mixed. Mercenary and auxiliary forces are useless and dangerous, as they are not truly loyal to the prince; they are ambitious, undisciplined, unfaithful, insolent to friends, and cowardly to enemies; they fear neither God nor men. Thus, the prince merely postpones his own ruin.
The prince must make himself a captain. The Republic will send one of its citizens for this post, but if he is unfortunate, he must be replaced immediately. But if he proves his worth, the Republic must secure his powers through laws.
The captains avoided fear and work for themselves and their soldiers, sparing themselves in combat and allowing themselves to be captured without ransom. Anything was permitted to them in their military code, which aimed to avoid work and dangers. In this way, they enslaved and disgraced Italy.
CHAPTER XIII - Concerning auxiliary, mixed, and native troops
Auxiliary troops are sent by powerful individuals to your aid. These can be good and useful, but in case of defeat you are down, and in case of victory, you become their prisoner. Mercenary forces, after a victory, need more time to cause harm, as they were organized and are paid by you.
All prudent princes repelled this type of troops, the auxiliaries, always preferring their own troops to achieve a true victory.
With this observation of different troops, it is concluded that without possessing one's own troops, no prince is guaranteed to avoid setbacks. One's own forces consist of subjects or citizens, or servants; all others are mercenary or auxiliary.
CHAPTER XIV - Concerning the duties of the prince toward his troops
CHAPTER XV - Concerning the reasons why men, and especially princes, are praised or blamed
CHAPTER XVI - Concerning liberality and parsimony
CHAPTER XVII - Concerning cruelty and clemency – whether it is better to be loved or feared
CHAPTER XVIII - In what manner princes must keep faith
The prince should have no other aim or thought than war, its organization and discipline, for that is the only art attributed to those who command. It is of such power that it not only maintains those who were born princes but often elevates citizens of particular condition to that quality. A prince not skilled in warfare, besides other misfortunes, as has been said, cannot have the esteem of his soldiers nor can he trust them.
A wise prince should consider the histories of other countries and meditate on the actions of illustrious men, study the reasons for their defeats and victories, and never be idle in times of peace; rather, he should, intelligently, build up a reserve of knowledge from which he can draw profit in adversity, so that he may at any time be prepared to resist it.
Princes are made remarkable by qualities that bring them reproach or praise. Anyone will recognize that it would be very praiseworthy for a prince to possess all the qualities considered good; but the condition of man is such that it does not allow him to possess them completely; it is necessary for the prince to be so prudent that he knows how to avoid the defects that would take away his government and practice the qualities that would ensure its possession.
Liberalidad used to spread your fame for liberality is not a virtue; if it is practiced virtuously and as it should be, it will be ignored and you will not escape the ill repute of its opposite. Therefore, not being able to use this virtue without prejudice to himself, he, being prudent, should despise the reputation of being avaricious, for over time, he will be able to show that he is always more liberal, as the people will see that the prince's parsimony makes his revenue sufficient, allowing him to defend himself from those who wage war against him, and thus being liberal to all those from whom he takes nothing, which are many, and stingy to those to whom he gives nothing, which are very few. It is more prudent to have the reputation of being stingy, which brings ill repute without hatred, than to incur that of being wasteful in order to gain the reputation of being liberal, which constitutes hateful infamy.
Every prince should wish to be considered pious and not cruel; however, he must take care to employ this piety conveniently. He should not, therefore, mind the repute of being cruel to keep his subjects united and faithful, because, with minor exceptions, he is more pious than by excessive clemency he allows disorders to arise, which may lead to murders or robberies. For such consequences harm the whole people, and executions harm only one person. It is much safer to be feared than loved when forced to fail in one of the two. Men hesitate less to offend those who are loved than those who are feared. A prince should make himself feared in such a way that, if he is not loved, he at least avoids hatred, for it is easy to be feared and not hated at the same time. Therefore, a wise prince loves men as they wish to be loved, and being feared by them as they wish, he should establish himself in what is his and not in what is another's. In short, he should merely avoid being hated.
There are two ways of fighting: one by laws, the other by force. The first is natural to man, the second to beasts. It is necessary for the prince, however, to know how to employ both the animal and the man conveniently, and one without the other is the origin of instability. A prince cannot, nor should he, keep his word when it is detrimental to him and when the reasons that determined him cease to exist. A prince cannot follow all things considered good, often being forced to act against charity, faith, humanity, and religion. In the actions of men, especially princes, only the good or bad outcome matters. He should therefore strive to conquer and maintain the state, for the means he employs will always be judged honorable and praised, because the common people are led by appearances and by the consequences of accomplished facts, and the world is made up of the common people, and there will be no place for the minority if the majority does not find a place to rely on.
Chapter XIX - How a prince should guard against contempt and hatred
The prince seeks to avoid things that make him hated or contemptible, and whenever he acts thus, he will fulfill his duty and will find no danger in other defects. What makes him especially hated is being rapacious and usurping the property and women of his subjects. Being considered fickle, frivolous, effeminate, cowardly, and irresolute makes him contemptible. Such things must be avoided in the same way that a navigator avoids a rock. He should ensure that his actions display greatness, courage, gravity, and fortitude, and regarding the private actions of his subjects, he should ensure that his presence is irrevocable, behaving in such a way that no one thinks of deceiving him or making him change his mind.
He must defend himself from these with good arms and good allies, and having arms, he will always have good friends. Internal affairs, in turn, will be stabilized if external matters are stabilized, except for those that are already disturbed by a conspiracy. Regarding his subjects, he must fear that they will always conspire in secret, and if he has managed to ensure that the people are satisfied with him. A Prince should care little about conspiracies if he is beloved by the people, for if the people are his enemies and hate him, he must fear everything and everyone. He must esteem the powerful, but not become hated by the people.
And it must be noted that hatred is acquired either by good or bad actions. Therefore, a Prince desiring to preserve the state is often obliged not to be good, because when the majority, be it the people, the senate, or the great, on which you believe you need to rely to remain in power, is corrupt, it is convenient for you to follow their thinking to satisfy them, and thus good deeds are harmed.
It is to be noted at this point that assassinations, deliberated by stubborn men, are impossible for Princes to avoid, because anyone who is not afraid of death can carry them out; however, the Prince should not be afraid, as they are very rare. He should only avoid seriously insulting any of the people he uses and has by his side in the service of his government, as Antoninus did. He had disgracefully murdered a brother of that centurion, and still threatened him daily, yet he kept him in his guard, which was a reckless thing and capable of ruining him as it happened.
However, whoever observes what has been narrated will understand that hatred and contempt were the causes of the ruin of many emperors and will also know the reasons why some of them, acting in one way and others in another, some ended well and others had a sad end.
Chapter XX - Whether fortresses and other things which princes frequently make are useful or not
Some Princes, to preserve their state securely, have disarmed their subjects, others have divided conquered cities by fostering factions to fight each other, others have nurtured enmities against themselves, others have sought the support of those who were suspicious of them at the beginning of their rule, some others have built fortresses.
Taking away arms, mainly to offend them, implying distrust or cowardice. Any of these opinions will arouse hatred against you. There has never been a Prince in a new principality who has not always organized armed forces, but a Prince who conquers a new state, which is annexed to his dominion, then it is necessary to disarm that state, except for those who helped to conquer it, and even these must, over time, be made apathetic and weak, so that all the arms of that state are with your soldiers, who lived with you in the old state.
Often, the services of former adversaries serve the Prince better than those who, out of excessive security, neglect the Prince's interests.
Considering all these things, we will praise those who build fortresses and also those who do not build them, and we will lament those who, trusting in such means of defense, do not care that the people hate them.
Chapter XXI - What a prince must do to be esteemed
Nothing makes a prince so esteemed as great enterprises and giving rare examples of himself. A prince must be careful not to ally himself with a more powerful one, unless he is forced by necessity, because, if he wins, he will be beholden to his ally; and princes must avoid being at the mercy of another at all costs.
A prince must show himself to be a lover of virtue and honor those who excel in any art.
Chapter XXII - Concerning the secretaries of princes
The choice of his ministers is not a matter of minor importance. For a prince to know his minister well, there is this way that never fails: when you notice that the minister thinks more of himself than of you, and that in all his actions he seeks personal gain, you can be sure that he is not good, and you can never trust him; he who directs the affairs of state should never think of himself, but always of the prince, and never remind him of things that are outside the sphere of the state.
The prince, to secure himself from his minister, must think of him, honoring him, making him rich, making him incur obligations to you, making him participate in honors and positions, so that the many honors do not bring him the desire for others.
Chapter XXIII - How flatterers are to be avoided
There is no other way to guard against flattery than to make men understand that they do not offend you by telling the truth; but when everyone can tell you the truth, they will lack respect for you. A prudent prince should, therefore, behave in a third way, choosing wise men in his state and granting only to them the right to tell him the truth about things, but only about those matters that he inquires of them.
A prince should therefore always take advice, but when he judges it appropriate and not when others wish. Even if he judges that someone, out of fear, will not tell him the truth, the prince should not fail to show his displeasure. It is concluded from this that good advice, wherever it comes from, is born from the prudence of the prince, and not the prudence of the prince from good advice.
Chapter XXIV - Why the princes of Italy have lost their states
A new prince is much more watched in his actions than a hereditary one, and when these actions show virtue, they attract men much more and oblige them much more than the antiquity of blood. This is because men are much more attached to present things than to past ones, and when they find good in them, they are content and seek nothing more; rather, they will defend the prince if he does not fail in other respects in his promises.
Thus, these princes of ours who, for many years, possessed their principalities, only to lose them later, should not blame fortune, but rather their own ignavius; because, having never thought in good times that times could change (and it is common for men not to worry in good times about storms), when adverse times arrived, they thought of fleeing and not defending themselves, and waited for the populations, tired of the insolence of the victors, to recall them.
You would not want to fall merely because you believe you will find someone to lift you up. This either does not happen, or, when it does, it will not bring you security, because the defense that does not depend on you is weak. And the defenses that depend on yourself and your valor are always good, certain, and lasting.
Chapter XXV - How much the outcome of human affairs and in what manner one should resist it
I am not unaware that many have had and still have the opinion that the affairs of the world are directed by fortune and by God, so that human prudence cannot correct them, nor does it provide any remedy for them. This is what happens with impetuous rivers that, when they become enraged, flood the plains, destroy trees, buildings, everything yields to their impetus, without being able to oppose it; but it is no less true that men can, when the river calms down, provide dikes so that from the next onslaught of the river, it will pass through channels that will certainly contain part of the damage. The same happens with fortune; its power manifests itself where there is no organized resistance.
Regarding the paths that lead men to the goals they seek, they can be diverse. It is observed that two individuals, to reach the same objective, can act in completely different ways; on the other hand, two men acting in the same way may not achieve the same results. But certainly, in whatever way a man behaves, he must modify his way of acting according to the time and the circumstances.
I conclude, therefore, by saying that, by modifying fortune, and by men obstinately preserving their way of proceeding, they are happy as long as that way of acting and the particularities of the time combine. When they do not combine, they will be unhappy.
Chapter XXVI - Exhortation to the prince to free Italy from the barbarians
Thus, having been left as if lifeless, Italy awaits one who can heal its wounds and put an end to the plundering of Lombardy, the tribute of the kingdom of Naples and Tuscany, and who can cure its sores that have long been festering. It is perceived that she asks God to send her someone to redeem her from such cruelties and insolence of foreigners. It is even seen that she is ready and willing to follow a banner, provided there is someone to raise it. Here there is much valor in the people, although there is a lack of leaders. Observe, in duels and tournaments, how much Italians surpass others in strength, skill, and intelligence. However, when it comes to armies, such qualities do not manifest themselves. And it all stems from the weakness of the leaders, for those who know are not obeyed, and everyone believes they know a lot, and no one has yet emerged whose valor or fortune is so outstanding that it forces others to make way for him. It is for this reason that in so many years, in so many wars that have occurred in these last twenty years, every entirely Italian army has always fared poorly.
It is therefore necessary to prepare arms, to be able to defend oneself from foreigners with Italian bravery. And although the Swiss and Spanish infantry are considered formidable, both have defects, so that a third power, if it were to be created, could not only oppose them but also have confidence in victory. It is therefore possible, by knowing the defects of these two infantries, to organize a third that can resist cavalry and does not fear its rival. And from this will come the formation of a generation of warriors and the alteration of methods. And it is these things that, when reorganized, give reputation and greatness to a new prince.
One must not, therefore, let this opportunity slip away, in order to allow Italy, after so long, to find a redeemer. This dominion of barbarians already stinks to everyone. Take, therefore, your illustrious house this task with that spirit and that faith with which good causes are espoused, so that, under its coat of arms, this homeland may be ennobled, and under its auspices may that expression of Petrarch be fulfilled.
APPENDIX - Letter from Machiavelli to Francesco Vettori
Magnificent Ambassador. The graces of God are never late. I say this because I had thought I had not lost, but weakened, your favor, as you had not written to me for so long, and I was in doubt where the reason could come from. And to all those that came to my mind, I attached little importance, except for the one that made me doubt that you had stopped writing to me because you had been told that I was not a good keeper of your letters; and I knew that, excluding Felippo and Pagolo, no one else had seen them from me. I cannot, therefore, wishing to return equal favors, tell you in this letter anything other than about my life, and if you judge that I should exchange it for yours, I would be satisfied to change it. And as Dante said, the science of one who has not kept what he has heard cannot exist – I note what I have gathered from your conversation and composed a booklet DE PRINCIPATIBUS, where I delve as deeply as I can into the cogitations on this subject, discussing what a principality is, of how many species there are, how they are acquired, how they can be maintained, why they are lost; and if any fantasy of mine has ever pleased you, this one should not displease you. And my faith should not be doubted, for I have always observed faith, and I will not break it now; and whoever has been faithful and good for forty-three years, which is how old I am, should not be able to change his nature; and my poverty is a testament to my faith and goodness. I therefore wish that you would still write to me what you think on this subject, and I commend myself to you.
Extracts from Machiavelli's discourses on Livy's decades
[Commented by Napoleon Bonaparte]
I - It is difficult for a people accustomed to living under the rule of a prince, having fallen, by some eventuality, under a republican government, to remain in it.
II - A people corrupted in a republican state is maintained with great difficulty.
III - When a monarchical state has begun well, a weak prince can maintain himself in it, but there is no kingdom that can sustain itself when the successor of that prince is as weak as he himself is.
Princes are weak when they are not always ready to wage war.
IV - The prince who enters a state new to him must renew it entirely.
Whoever becomes prince of a state, or province, particularly when he is weakly established in them. It is necessary to establish new governments with new names in the cities, new authority and new men, as David did when he became king: he must build new cities, destroy old ones, move inhabitants from one place to another, that is, leave nothing unaltered in that province.
He who wishes to reign over a new province, neglecting this wise alternative of living as a private individual, must do this evil if he wishes to maintain himself.
V - The populace is daring, but at heart it is weak.
I am certain, therefore, that the good or bad disposition of a people should be taken into little account if you are in a position to contain it and to provide that you are not offended by any individual, well or ill disposed.
The bad dispositions arising from these causes are formidable and require greater remedies to suppress and contain them, whereas this is easier in other bad dispositions, provided that the people do not have chiefs to whom they can resort.
For this reason, a rebellious populace, wishing to avoid such dangers, should choose a chief, think of its defense, as the masses of Rome did. When the plebs do not take such care, what Livy said always happens to them, that is, together they are all audacious, and then each one becomes cowardly and weak when he begins to think of the danger that threatens him.
I do not believe it can be said that among those born of humble condition who have risen to hold a scepter, there was at least one who did so by force and weakness.
What princes need to do for their elevation is also necessary in new republics, until they have become powerful and only need strength to sustain themselves.
VI - Whoever rises from a low condition to the highest elevation achieves much more by fraud than by force.
VII - The prince who, through his deference to the governed, believes he can temper their audacity, is generally mistaken.
It has often been found that this word is not only useless but also harmful, especially when you exercise it with insolent men who, out of envy or other motives, hate you.
A prince, therefore, should never allow himself to be lowered from his position nor abandon anything, unless he cannot or believes he cannot retain what compels him to cede. It is almost always the case that when the matter has reached a point where it cannot be yielded willingly, it is better to let it be taken by force rather than to let it be stolen through it. When you cede out of fear, it is to avoid a war, and often you cannot cede it willingly, but rather let it be taken by force. When you cede out of fear, it is to avoid a war, and often you do not avoid it. He to whom, out of visible cowardice, you have granted what he wanted, will not stop at that.
VIII - How dangerous it is for a prince, as well as for a republic, not to punish outrages committed against a nation or against a particular individual.
One can perceive how much indignation caused by the impunity of the guilty must occasion harm if one considers what happened to the Romans for not having punished the perfidy of their three ambassadors regarding the Clusines. The French, learning that those who deserved only punishment had been honored, viewed this conduct as offensive and ignominious to themselves and, indignant and enraged, they threw themselves upon Rome and took it, with the exception of the Capitol.
This misfortune did not happen to the Romans solely because they had failed in justice, but because their ambassadors, who should have been punished for having acted criminally against the law of nations, were showered with honors for this infamy. Therefore, princes should take care; for if they are gravely offended by someone, individual or state, and do not receive satisfaction for it, they will exact revenge in a way that is fatal to the state.
The prince should never underestimate any of his subjects who believes that, by adding his own injury to that which one of them may have done him, whether a private citizen or a courtier, he has the idea of avenging himself on the prince, even if it brings misfortune upon himself.
IX - Fortune blinds the minds of men when she does not want them to oppose her own designs.
If one considers the course of human affairs, one will recognize that accidents often occur against which the heavens have not wished men to be able to preserve themselves.
Nothing is truer than this conclusion: men whose lives have been shaped by great adversities or by perennial prosperity deserve neither censure nor praise.
When fortune wishes great things to be done, she works competently, choosing a man of great genius to recognize the occasions she will present him with and of sufficient value to take advantage of them.
It is true that men can help fortune; they can direct, not cut, the thread of her operations. Nevertheless, they should never despair, because, not knowing the end to which she leads and walking through controversial and unknown paths, they should always hope, and consequently, sustain themselves with hope, regardless of any critical or uncomfortable circumstance in which they find themselves.
X - A government should avoid entrusting offices or administrations of some importance to those whom it has offended.
This truth is so evident that it is enough to present here the example that Roman history provides.
When we see that resentment exerts such an influence on a Roman citizen, in times when Rome was not corrupted, we must foresee how much it can do in a citizen of a state where corruption has been introduced and where souls are devoid of all ancient Roman magnanimity.
XI - Why the French were and still are looked upon, at the beginning of a combat, as more than men and less than women when it is prolonged.
To demonstrate my opinion, I must observe that there are some types of armies: the first is one in which order is combined with fury, and in which fury and valor stem from the prevailing order; such was the effect that the Romans observed in their armies.
Another type of army is one in which there is neither natural fury nor Western order; such are the Italian armies of our time, which are for this reason absolutely useless.
XII - On the genius of the French
The French genius grasps the benefits and disadvantages of the moment so quickly that they retain little memory of past goods and evils and are little concerned with future good or evil.
XIII - Painting of things in France
The French are, by nature, more fiery than daring or skillful, and when someone resists their fury in the first charge, they become humble and lose so much valor that they become as cowardly as women.
They cannot stand narrowness and discomfort, and time softens them so much in campaign that, if it is possible to make them wait, they disband, and then it is easy to defeat them... Therefore, he who wishes to triumph over them should contain them in their first assault, entertain them to gain time, and he will conquer them. This is why Caesar said that the French - Gauls - were, at first, more than men, and at the end, less than women.
XIV - Details of Castruccio Castracani, lord of Lucca
In a terrible battle that Castruccio Castracani sustained against the Florentines, seeing that it had lasted long enough for them to be as tired as his own troops, he ordered a thousand infantrymen to advance through his own ranks and ordered those at the vanguard to open up and make a retrograde movement, some to the right and others to the left, as if withdrawing.
Castruccio used to say that men should try everything and be surprised by nothing; that God loves valorous men, considering that we should punish the weak through them.
He ordered the killing of a citizen of Lucca who had contributed to his rise, and when it was thrown in his face that he had killed a friend, he replied that they were mistaken, as he had only ordered the killing of a new enemy.
Bibliography
MACHIAVELLI, Niccolò. The Prince; commented by Napoleon Bonaparte; translation by Torrieri Guimarães. São Paulo: Hemus-Livraria Editora Ltda., 1977
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