COMMENTED BY NAPOLEON BONAPARTE
Introduction
As Second Chancellor of Florence, Machiavelli had a very active political life. It was a time of change; the feudal system was being replaced by capitalist production, sovereignties were being absorbed by monarchies, and power was being centralized in Europe, except in Italy.
Machiavelli then participated in meetings with foreign courts to make political agreements. His life experiences are recounted in this book, showing the common man the true intentions of an ambitious ruler.
Niccoló Machiavelli - To the magnificent Lorenzo, son of Piero de' Medici
Princes always receive gifts befitting them, but I have found nothing among my possessions other than the experiences I have gained throughout my life, which I now send to Your Magnificence, condensed into a small volume.
Therefore, please accept this small gift, and as you read this work, may it fulfill my wish that you attain the greatness that fortune and your other qualities assure you.
Chapter I - Of the kinds of principalities and how they are acquired
States can be republics or principalities, which were either inherited by blood or recently acquired. The new ones, such as Milan with Francesco Sforza, or those territories joined to a state that inherits a prince, like the Kingdom of Naples to the King of Spain. These acquired domains are subject to a prince or are free, and are acquired by foreign or own troops.
Chapter II - Of hereditary principalities
I will not speak of republics, but only of principalities, and I will try to show how hereditary principalities can be governed and maintained. States bound to their prince's family are less difficult to govern than new ones, as it is enough not to abandon the predecessors' practices. If the prince is intelligent, he will remain in power.
In Italy, for example, we have the Duke of Ferrara, who resisted the attack of the Venetians in 1484 and Pope Julius in 1510, solely because his family's domain was ancient, and it was evident he was more beloved.
Chapter III - Of mixed principalities
The greatest difficulty lies in new principalities, which can also be states joined to hereditary ones, which we could call mixed principalities. This is because the people revolt against the new prince who had to offend the new subjects with his troops and through other offenses that a recent conquest brings.
Then, all those who were harmed by the occupation of the principalities will be your enemies, and your friends will be those who put you there because they were dissatisfied. And even if you are strong, you cannot be violent against them because you need the goodwill of the inhabitants. This was the mistake of Louis XII, King of France, when he occupied Milan; the same people who opened the gates turned against him when they realized he was not bringing them the good they expected from that prince.
States conquered and added to an ancient state, being in the same province and of the same language, are easily subdued, especially if they are not accustomed to living freely.
For states with different languages but the same customs, the conqueror, to preserve them, must consider two rules: first, extinguish the language of the former prince; second, do not change the laws and taxes.
In a province with a different language, customs, and legislation, the most effective way to conquer is for the prince to reside there, so he can quell disorder as soon as it arises; otherwise, by the time the news reaches him, it will be too late to act. Another method is to establish colonies in some places within the conquered province.
The Romans organized colonies in conquered provinces; see in the province of Greece, Rome fostered the Achaeans and Aetolians, subdued the kingdom of Macedon, and expelled Antiochus.
The desire for conquest is indeed natural and common, and men who can satisfy it will always be praised and never blamed. But those who cannot and wish to do so anyway are mistaken and deserve censure.
Chapter IV - Why the Kingdom of Darius, conquered by Alexander, did not revolt against his successors
It is astonishing that Alexander the Great conquered Asia in a few years and died soon after, and the people did not revolt against his successors. Of the principalities we recall, there are two ways they are governed: either by princes assisted by ministers, or by a prince and barons.
Such barons have their own domain and subjects, who recognize them as lords and feel a natural affection for them.
Now, considering the nature of Darius's government, it is similar to that of the Sultan of Turkey. If it was necessary for Alexander to defeat the enemy en masse after the victory, after Darius's death, the state was secure. And Alexander's successors, had they remained united, could have enjoyed that kingdom in idleness; there were no other disturbances than those they themselves caused.
The conquest of a people is not solely the merit of the victor, but of the differences among the subjugated peoples.
Chapter V - On the method of governing cities or principalities that, before being occupied, were governed by their own laws
An explanation of how to preserve governments with inherent ideologies. No matter how many new ideologies are introduced, the old laws of the principality will endure until the new principality transgresses the old rules and declares new ones, provided that the '...memory of lost freedom is allowed to rest.'
Chapter VI - Of new principalities acquired by arms and virtue
Citation of examples such as Moses, Theseus, among others, who became princes through their own virtue.
Chapter VII - Of new principalities acquired by the arms and fortune of others
The author discusses Cesare Borgia, son of Pope Alexander VI, whose conquests were driven by his father's position and then by alliances with stronger individuals like Remirro de Orco.
Chapter VIII - Of those who have attained a principality by crime
In this chapter, the author deals with the acquisition of a principality through '...wicked or nefarious acts...' It is worth noting the way Machiavelli proposes how injuries to the people should be dispensed, according to him, '...all at once, so that, lasting a short time, they are felt less...' It is also interesting how benefits to the people should be administered: '...little by little, so that they may be better savored...'
Chapter IX - Of the civil principality
What can be called a civil principality, as it does not require great valor or fortune, but rather cunning. This is achieved by the favor of the nobles or the people. In cities, these two dispositions are found: the people do not want to be oppressed by the nobles, and the nobles wish to command and oppress the people. These two desires produce effects: the principality, freedom, or tyranny.
The principality is the work of the people or the nobles, according to the opportunity seized by one or the other. The nobles realize they cannot oppose the people, so they begin to promote the reputation of a member of the people and make him prince. This prince faces difficulties in maintaining power. The people, realizing their inability to oppose the nobles, grant prestige to someone and make him prince, so that his authority may defend them. This person helps the people without difficulty, as he is surrounded by others who seem equal to him.
On the other hand, one who attains the condition of prince thanks to the people finds himself alone, with no one or very few around him who are not ready to obey him. He can honestly satisfy the nobles without harming others, but he can certainly satisfy the people, as their desire is more honorable than that of the nobles; the nobles wish to oppress, and the people do not wish to be oppressed.
The worst a prince can expect from a hostile populace is to be abandoned by them; but hostile nobles must not only be feared to abandon him but also to attack him. This prince must always live with the same people, but not always with the same nobles.
For a prince, it is necessary to count on the friendship of the people; otherwise, there will be no solutions in adversity. A wise prince must devise a way for his citizens, always and in all circumstances, to need the state and him, so that they will always remain loyal to him.
Chapter X - How the forces of all principalities ought to be measured
Princes capable of sustaining themselves, who can, with abundance of men and money, constitute a strong army and face any assailant. These armies must be governed by laws. Thus, this principality will have a fortified city, but it must not be hated.
Human nature obliges one to repay favors received. It can be concluded that it will not be difficult for a prudent prince to secure himself from his people.
Chapter XI - Ecclesiastical principalities
These face all sorts of obstacles because they are obtained by merit or fortune, but they are maintained by the routine of religion. These are so strong that they keep their princes in power, regardless of how they live. Due to this power, these principalities are considered secure and happy.
It is to be expected that some have made the Papacy powerful by arms. The current pontiff, through his goodness and many other virtues, will make it stronger and more revered.
Chapter XII - Of the kinds of militias and of mercenary soldiers
It is necessary for a prince to have solid foundations, such as good laws and principles. Since good laws do not exist where there are no arms, the forces with which a prince preserves his state are either his own, mercenary, auxiliary, or mixed. Mercenary and auxiliary forces are useless and dangerous, as they are not truly loyal to the prince; they are ambitious, undisciplined, unfaithful, insolent to friends, and cowardly as enemies. They fear neither God nor trust men. Thus, the prince merely delays his own ruin.
The prince must make himself a captain. The republic will send one of its citizens for this role, but if he is unsuccessful, he must be replaced immediately. But if he proves his worth, the republic must secure his powers through laws.
The captains kept themselves and their soldiers away from fear and work, sparing themselves in battles and allowing themselves to be captured without ransom. Anything was permitted to them in their military code, which aimed to avoid work and dangers. Thus, they enslaved and disgraced Italy.
CHAPTER XIII - Of auxiliary, mixed, and native troops
Auxiliary troops are sent by powerful individuals to your aid. These can be good and useful, but in case of defeat, you are weakened, and in case of victory, you become their prisoner. Mercenary forces, after a victory, need more time to cause harm, as they were organized and are paid by you.
All prudent princes repelled these types of troops, the auxiliaries, always preferring their own troops to achieve a true victory.
With this observation of different troops, it is concluded that without possessing one's own troops, no prince is guaranteed to avoid setbacks. Own forces are composed of subjects or citizens, or servants; all others are mercenary or auxiliary.
CHAPTER XIV - Of the duties of the prince towards his troops
CHAPTER XV - Of the reasons why men, and especially princes, are praised or blamed
CHAPTER XVI - Of liberality and parsimony
CHAPTER XVII - Of cruelty and mercy - whether it is better to be loved or feared
CHAPTER XVIII - In what manner princes should keep their word
A prince should have no other aim or thought than war, its organization and discipline, for this is the only art attributed to those who command. It is so powerful that it not only maintains those who were born princes but often elevates citizens of humble condition to that quality. A prince unversed in military matters, besides other misfortunes, as mentioned, cannot gain the esteem of his soldiers nor trust them.
A wise prince should study the histories of other countries and meditate on the actions of illustrious men, analyze the reasons for their defeats and victories, and never be idle in times of peace. Instead, he should intelligently build up resources from which he can benefit in adversity, so as to be prepared to resist them at any time.
Princes are made remarkable by the qualities that bring them blame or praise. Anyone will recognize that it would be very commendable for a prince to possess all the qualities considered good; but the condition of man is such that it does not allow for their complete possession. It is necessary for the prince to be so prudent that he knows how to avoid the defects that would lead to his loss of government and practice the qualities that would ensure its possession.
Liberality used to spread your fame for liberality is not a virtue; if it is practiced virtuously and as it should be, it will be unknown and you will not escape the ill repute of its opposite. Therefore, being unable to use this virtue without detriment to himself, he should, being prudent, disregard the stigma of being stingy, for over time he will be able to demonstrate that he is always more liberal, as the people will see that the prince's parsimony suffices for his revenue, allowing him to defend himself against those who wage war against him. In this way, he is liberal to all those from whom he takes nothing, which are many, and stingy to those to whom he gives nothing, which are very few. It is more prudent to have a reputation for miserliness, which brings ill repute without hatred, than, to have a reputation for liberality, to incur also that of being wasteful, which constitutes hateful infamy.
Every prince should wish to be considered merciful and not cruel; nevertheless, he must take care to employ this mercy conveniently. He must not, therefore, mind the stigma of cruelty to keep his subjects united and loyal, because, with few exceptions, he is more merciful than by excessive clemency he allows disorders to arise, from which murders or robberies may result. For such consequences harm the entire populace, while executions harm only one person. It is much safer to be feared than loved when one is obliged to fail in one of the two. Men hesitate less to offend those who are loved than those who are feared. A prince should make himself feared in such a way that, if he is not loved, he at least avoids hatred, for it is easy to be feared and not hated at the same time. Therefore, a wise prince loves men as they wish to be loved, and fears them as they wish to be feared, he must hold fast to what is his and not to what belongs to others. In short, he must avoid being hated.
There are two ways of fighting: one by laws, the other by force. The former is natural to man, the latter to animals. It is necessary for a prince, however, to know how to employ both the animal and the man conveniently, and one without the other leads to instability. A prince, however prudent, cannot and should not keep his word when it is detrimental to him and when the reasons that determined him cease to exist. A prince cannot adhere to all things considered good, often being compelled to act against charity, faith, humanity, and religion. In the actions of men, especially princes, only the good or bad outcome matters. Let him therefore strive to conquer and maintain the state, for the means he employs will always be judged honorable and praised, as the common people are swayed by appearances and by the consequences of accomplished facts, and the world is made up of the common people, and there will be no place for the minority if the majority does not find a place to rely on.
Chapter XIX - How a prince should avoid being despised or hated
A prince should seek to avoid things that make him hated or despised, and whenever he acts thus, he will fulfill his duty and find no danger in other defects. What makes him particularly hated is being rapacious and usurping the property and women of his subjects. He becomes despised by being considered fickle, frivolous, effeminate, cowardly, and irresolute. These things should be avoided just as a navigator avoids a rock. He should ensure that his actions demonstrate greatness, courage, gravity, and fortitude, and regarding the private actions of his subjects, he should ensure that his presence is irrevocable, behaving in such a way that no one thinks of deceiving him or changing his mind.
He should defend himself from these with good arms and good allies, and having arms, he will always have good friends. Internal affairs, in turn, will be stabilized if external affairs are stabilized, unless they are already disturbed by a conspiracy. Regarding subjects, one must fear that they will always conspire in secret, and if he has managed to keep the people satisfied with him. A prince should care little about conspiracies if he is loved by the people, for if the people are his enemy and hate him, he should fear everything and everyone. He should respect the powerful, but not become hated by the people.
And it is important to note that hatred is acquired either by good or bad actions. Therefore, a prince wishing to preserve his state is often compelled not to be good, because when the majority, whether people, senate, or nobles, upon whom he believes he depends to maintain power, is corrupt, it is convenient for him to follow their thinking to satisfy them, and thus, good actions are harmed.
It should be noted at this point that assassinations, deliberately carried out by obstinate men, are impossible for Princes to avoid because anyone who has no fear of death can carry them out. However, the Prince should not be intimidated, as they are very rare. He should only avoid gravely injuring any of the people he uses and has at his side in his government, as Antoninus did. He had disgracefully murdered a brother of that centurion, and still threatened the centurion daily, but nevertheless, kept him in his service, which was a reckless thing and capable of ruining him, as it happened.
However, anyone who observes what has been narrated will understand that hatred and contempt were the causes of the ruin of many emperors and will also know the reasons why some of them, acting one way and others another, some ended well and others met a sad end.
Chapter XX - Whether fortresses and other things usually made by a prince are useful or not
Some Princes, to secure their state, have disarmed their subjects, others have divided conquered cities, keeping factions fighting each other, others have fostered enmities against themselves, others have sought the support of those who were initially suspicious of them, and others have built fortresses.
Disarming them, besides offending them, implies distrust or cowardice. Any of these opinions will incite hatred against you. There has never been a Prince in a new principality who always organized an armed force. However, a Prince who conquers a new state, to be annexed to his dominion, must disarm that state, except for those who helped conquer it. Even these must, over time, be made apathetic and soft, so that all the arms of that state are with your soldiers, who lived with you in the old state.
Often, the services of former adversaries serve the Prince better than those who, out of excessive security, neglect the Prince's interests.
Considering all these things, we will praise those who build fortresses and also those who do not build them, and we will lament those who, relying on such means of defense, do not care that the people hate them.
Chapter XXI - What a prince must do to be esteemed
Nothing makes a prince so esteemed as great enterprises and rare examples of self-sacrifice. A prince must be careful not to ally himself with a more powerful one, unless compelled by necessity, because, if victorious, he will become beholden to the ally; and princes must avoid being at the mercy of another at all costs.
A prince must show himself to be a lover of virtues and honor those who excel in any art.
Chapter XXII - Of the ministers of princes
The choice of his ministers is not a matter of minor importance. For a prince to know his minister well, there is this unfailing method: when you notice that the minister thinks more of himself than of you, and that in all his actions he seeks personal gain, you can be sure that he is not good, and you can never trust him; one who manages the affairs of state should never think of himself, but always of the prince, and never remind him of things outside the sphere of the state.
To secure himself from his minister, the prince must think of him, honoring him, making him rich, making him incur obligations towards you, making him participate in honors and positions, so that the many honors do not make him desire others.
Chapter XXIII - How to avoid flatterers
There is no other way to protect oneself from flattery than to make men understand that they do not offend you by telling the truth; however, when everyone can tell you the truth, they will lack respect for you. A prudent prince, therefore, must behave in a third way, choosing wise men in his state and granting them the right to tell him the truth about matters, but only those they are asked about.
A prince should always seek advice, but when he judges it appropriate, not when others desire it. Even if he judges that someone, out of fear, does not tell him the truth, the prince must not fail to show his displeasure. From this, it is concluded that good advice, wherever it comes from, stems from the prince's prudence, and not the prince's prudence from good advice.
Chapter XXIV - Why the princes of Italy have lost their states
A new prince is much more scrutinized in his actions than a hereditary one, and when these actions show virtue, they attract men much more and obligate them much more than the antiquity of blood. This is because men are much more attached to present things than to past ones, and when they find good in the former, they are content and seek nothing more; rather, they will defend the prince if he does not fail in his other promises.
Thus, these princes of ours who, for many years, possessed their principalities, only to lose them later, should not blame fortune, but rather their own idleness; because having never, in good times, thought that times could change (and it is common for men not to worry about storms in fair weather), when adverse times arrived, they thought of fleeing and not defending themselves, and waited for the populations, tired of the insolence of the victors, to reclaim them.
You would not wish to fall merely because you believe you will find someone to lift you up. This either does not happen, or when it does, it will not bring you security, because the means of defense that do not depend on you are weak. And the means of defense that depend on you and your valor are always good, sure, and lasting.
Chapter XXV - How much fortune can do in human affairs and how to resist it
I am not unaware that many have had and still have the opinion that the affairs of the world are governed by fortune and by God, so that human prudence cannot correct them, nor even provide any remedy. This is what happens with impetuous rivers that, when they become enraged, flood the plains, destroy trees, buildings, everything yields to their impetus, without being able to oppose them; but it is no less true that men can, when the river calms down, provide dikes so that, from the next raging of the river, it will flow through channels that will certainly contain part of the damage. The same happens with fortune; its power manifests itself where there is no organized resistance.
Regarding the paths that lead men to the goals they seek, they can be diverse. It is observed that two individuals, to reach the same objective, can act in completely different ways; conversely, two men acting in the same way may not achieve the same results. But certainly, in whatever way a man behaves, he must modify his mode of action according to the time and circumstances.
I conclude, therefore, by saying that, as fortune changes, and men stubbornly maintain their mode of proceeding, they are happy as long as their mode of action and the particulars of the time align. When they do not align, they will be unhappy.
Chapter XXVI - Exhortation to the prince to free Italy from the hands of the barbarians
Thus, having been left as if lifeless, Italy awaits one who can heal its wounds and put an end to the pillaging of Lombardy, the tribute of the Kingdom of Naples and Tuscany, and cure its sores that have been festering for so long. It is evident that it begs God to send someone who will redeem it from such cruelties and insolences of foreigners. We even see that it is ready and willing to follow a banner, provided there is someone to raise it. There is much valor in the people, although there is a lack of leaders. Observe, in duels and tournaments, how much Italians are superior in strength, skill, and intelligence. However, when it comes to armies, such qualities do not manifest themselves. And it all stems from the weakness of the leaders, because those who know are not obeyed, and everyone believes they know a lot, and no one has yet emerged whose valor or fortune is so outstanding as to compel others to make way for him. For this reason, in so much time, in so many wars that have occurred in the last twenty years, every entirely Italian army has always fared poorly.
It is therefore necessary to prepare arms, to be able to defend oneself from foreigners with Italian valor. And although the Swiss and Spanish infantry are considered formidable, both have weaknesses, so that a third power, if created, could not only oppose them but also have confidence in victory. Thus, by knowing the weaknesses of these two infantry types, a third can be organized that resists cavalry and does not fear its rival. And from this will come the formation of a generation of warriors and the alteration of methods. And these are the things that, reorganized, give reputation and greatness to a new prince.
Therefore, this opportunity must not be missed, so that Italy, after so long, may find a redeemer. This dominion of barbarians already stinks to everyone. Take, therefore, this task upon your illustrious house with that spirit and faith with which good causes are embraced, so that, under your banner, this homeland may be ennobled, and under your auspices, that expression of Petrarch may be fulfilled.
APPENDIX - Letter from Machiavelli to Francesco Vettori
Magnificent Ambassador. God's graces are never late. I say this because I thought I had not lost, but weakened, your favor, as you remained so long without writing to me, and I was in doubt as to the reason. And to all the possibilities that occurred to me, I gave little importance, except for the one that I might have lost your favor because you heard that I was not a good keeper of your letters; and I knew that, apart from Felippo and Pagolo, no one else had seen them from me. I cannot, therefore, wishing to offer you equal thanks, tell you in this missive anything other than my life, and if you judge that I should exchange it for yours, I would be satisfied to change it. And as Dante said, that one who has not guarded what he has heard cannot have science – I note that from your conversation I have gained insight and composed a treatise DE PRINCIPATIBUS, where I delve as deeply as I can into the considerations of this subject, discussing what a principality is, of how many kinds there are, how they are conquered, how they can be maintained, why they are lost; and if any fantasy of mine has ever pleased you, this one should not displease you. And my faith should not be doubted, for I have always observed faith, and I will not break it now; and whoever has been faithful and good for forty-three years, which is how old I am, should not be able to change his nature; and my poverty is a testament to my faith and goodness. I therefore wish that you would still write to me what you think on this subject, and I commend myself to you.
Excerpts from Machiavelli's Discourses on Livy
[Commented by Napoleon Bonaparte]
I - It is difficult for a people accustomed to living under the rule of a prince, having fallen, by some eventuality, under a republican government, to remain in it.
II - A corrupted people in a republican state is maintained with great difficulty.
III - When a monarchical state began well, a weak prince can maintain himself in it, but there is no kingdom that can sustain itself when the successor of that prince is as weak as himself.
Princes are weak when they are not always ready to wage war.
IV - The prince who enters a new state for him must renovate it entirely.
Whoever becomes prince of a state, or province, particularly when he is weakly established in them. It is necessary to establish new governments, with new names for cities, a new authority, and new men, as David did when he became king: he must build new cities, destroy old ones, move inhabitants from one place to another, that is, leave nothing unchanged in that province.
Whoever wishes to reign over a new province, neglecting this wise alternative of living as a private individual, must commit this evil if he wishes to remain.
V - The rabble is daring, but fundamentally weak.
I am certain, therefore, that the good or bad disposition of a people should be taken lightly if you are in a position to contain it and to provide for not being offended by any individual, whether well or ill disposed.
Bad dispositions arising from these causes are formidable and require greater remedies to suppress and contain them, whereas this is easier in other bad dispositions, as long as the people do not have leaders to whom they can resort.
For this reason, a rebellious mob that wishes to avoid such dangers should choose a leader, think of its defense, as the Roman masses did. When the plebs do not take such precautions, what Livy said always happens to them, namely, that all together they are audacious, and then each one becomes cowardly and weak when he begins to think of the danger that threatens him.
I do not believe it can be said that among those who were born of humble condition and rose to wield a scepter, there was at least one who did so by force and weakness.
What princes need to do for their elevation is also necessary in new republics, until they become powerful and only need strength to sustain themselves.
VI - Whoever rises from a low condition to the highest elevation achieves much more through fraud than through force.
VII - The prince who, through his deference to the governed, believes he can temper their boldness, is generally mistaken.
It has often been observed that this word is not only entirely useless but also harmful, especially when you practice it with insolent men who, out of envy or other motives, hate you.
A prince, therefore, should never allow himself to be lowered from his position nor abandon anything, unless he cannot or believes he cannot retain what forces him to yield. It is almost always the case that when the matter has reached a point where it cannot be yielded willingly, it is better to let it be taken by force than to let it be stolen by means of it. When you yield out of fear to avoid a war, and often, you cannot yield willingly; it is better to let it be taken by force than to let it be stolen by means of it. When you yield out of fear to avoid a war, and often, you do not avoid it. He to whom, by effect of visible cowardice, you have granted what he wanted, will not stop there.
VIII - How dangerous it is for a prince, as well as for a republic, not to punish outrages committed against a nation or an individual.
One can perceive how much indignation caused by the impunity of the guilty must lead to harm if one considers what happened to the Romans for not punishing the perfidy of their three ambassadors with respect to the Gauls for whom they had sent to Clusium.
The Gauls, learning that those who deserved only punishment were honored, viewed this conduct as offensive and ignominious to themselves and, indignant and irate, fell upon Rome and took it, with the exception of the Capitol.
This misfortune did not happen to the Romans solely because they had failed in justice, but because their ambassadors, who should have been punished for having acted criminally against the law of nations, were heaped with honors for this infamy. Therefore, princes should take heed, for if seriously offended by someone, individual or state, and receiving no satisfaction, they will take a dire revenge upon the state.
The prince should never underestimate any of his subjects who believe that, by adding their own injury to that which one of them may have suffered, whether individual or courtier, they have the idea of taking revenge on the prince, even if it brings misfortune upon themselves.
IX - Fortune blinds the spirit of men when it does not want them to oppose its designs.
If one considers the course of human affairs, it will be recognized that accidents often occur against which the heavens did not wish men to be able to protect themselves.
Nothing is truer than this conclusion: men whose lives have been formed by great adversities or by perennial prosperity deserve neither censure nor praise.
When fortune wishes great things to be done, it works competently, choosing a man of great genius to recognize the opportunities it will present him and of sufficient valor to take advantage of them.
It is true that men can aid fortune; they can direct, not cut, the thread of its operations. Nevertheless, they should never be discouraged, because not knowing the end to which it leads and walking through controversial and unknown paths, they should always hope and, consequently, sustain themselves with hope, regardless of any critical or uncomfortable circumstance in which they find themselves.
X - A government should avoid entrusting important positions or administrations to those it has offended.
This truth is so evident that it is sufficient to present the example provided by Roman history.
When we see how much resentment influences a Roman citizen, in times when Rome was not corrupt, we must foresee how much it can do in a citizen of a state where corruption has been introduced and where souls are devoid of all ancient Roman magnanimity.
XI - Why the French were and still are regarded, at the beginning of combat, as more than men and less than women when it is prolonged.
To demonstrate my opinion, I must observe that there are several types of armies: the first is that in which order is combined with fury, and in which fury and valor stem from the prevailing order; such was the effect that the Romans observed in their armies.
Another type of army is one in which there is neither natural fury nor western order; such are the Italian armies of our time, which for this reason are absolutely useless.
XII - Of the genius of the French
The French genius recognizes the benefits and disadvantages of the moment so quickly that it retains little memory of past goods and evils and is little concerned with future good or evil.
XIII - Painting of the things of France
The French are, by nature, more fiery than daring or skilled, and when someone resists their fury in the first charge, they become humble and lose so much valor that they become as cowardly as women.
They cannot bear hardship and discomfort, and time weakens them so much in campaign that, if it is possible to make them wait, they disband, and then it is easy to defeat them... Therefore, whoever wishes to triumph over them should contain them in their first assault, entertain them to gain time, and he will defeat them. This is why Caesar said that the French - the Gauls - were, initially, more than men and, in the end, less than women.
XIV - Details of Castruccio Castracani, lord of Lucca
In a terrible battle that Castruccio Castracani sustained against the Florentines, seeing that it had lasted long enough for them to be as tired as his own troops, he ordered a thousand infantrymen to advance through his ranks and ordered those in the vanguard to open up and make a turning movement, some to the right and others to the left, as if they were retreating.
Castruccio used to say that men should experience everything and be surprised by nothing; that God loves valiant men, considering that we should punish the weak through them.
He ordered the execution of a citizen of Lucca who had contributed to his elevation, and when accused of having killed a friend, he replied that they were mistaken, as he had only ordered the killing of a new enemy.
Bibliography
MACHIAVELLI, Niccoló. The Prince; commented by Napoleon Bonaparte; translation by Torrieri
Guimarães. São Paulo: Hemus-Livraria Editora Ltda., 1977
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